Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
ATTY. MAKILITO B. MAHINAY &
HON. JUDGE OLEGARIO Promulgated:
SARMIENTO, JR.,
Respondents. June 16, 2006
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for indirect contempt in connection
with the respondents’ alleged defiance of the February 23, 2005 Decision
rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 161309, entitled Douglas Lu Ym v.
Gertrudes Nabua.[1]
The undisputed facts show that Gertrudes
Nabua and five of her 10 children filed an action for Accounting with Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-27717,
against his son, the herein petitioner, Douglas Lu Ym (Douglas )[2]
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, presided by respondent
Judge Olegario Sarmiento, Jr. (respondent Judge). Gertrudes alleged that she was the common law
wife of the deceased Cayetano Ludo (Cayetano) with whom she had 10 children,
including the petitioner. During the
lifetime of Cayetano, he founded Ludo and Lu Ym Corporation and acquired
numerous real properties like beach resorts, houses, condominium units,
commercial and agricultural lots; as well as personal properties like shares of
stocks in various corporations, a private jet, a fleet of imported cars such as
BMW, Mercedes Benz, Ferrari, Porsche, Jaguar, etc. Gertrudes claimed to be entitled to 50% of
all these properties.
Sometime in 1970, petitioner was
allowed to manage all the properties of Cayetano. When the latter’s death was impending, petitioner
was able to convince his siblings and Gertrudes to execute an alleged simulated
last will and testament to evade payment of excessive inheritance tax. After the death of Cayetano, the will was
probated. Gertrudes and her children
allegedly gave their consent thereto because they were made to believe that the
same was for the purpose of keeping the properties intact, including the 50%
share of Gertrudes which
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
contending that (1) Gertrudes and the other plaintiffs’ claims are barred by
prior judgment because the allowance of Cayetano’s will settled all the claims
over the properties; (2) Gertrudes has no legal capacity to sue because she is
not the common law wife of Cayetano who was legally married to a certain
Florame delos Reyes Ludo, as indicated in the death certificate of Cayetano;[3]
and because Ludo and Lu Ym Corporation is the real party in interest, the distributive share of Cayetano having been
assigned to the latter; and (3) the alleged action based on fraud in the
execution of the will has already prescribed.
In addition, their admission of being party to the fraudulent will purportedly
precluded them from asking relief from the court.[4]
The respondent Judge denied the motion
to dismiss ratiocinating that:
There are justiciable questions
raised in the pleadings of the herein parties which are proper subject of a
full blown trial. The Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint is hereby denied.[5]
On petition with the Court of Appeals,
the latter affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
Unfazed, petitioner elevated the case
to this Court in G.R. No. 161309, entitled Douglas Lu Ym v. Gertrudes Nabua. On
However, while it was error for the
appellate court to rule that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, it does not necessarily
follow that the motion to dismiss should have been granted. The instant petition raises significant
factual questions as regards petitioner’s claim that the Amended Complaint should have been dismissed which are properly
addressed to the trial court. Moreover,
it cannot be gainsaid that the trial court should be given the opportunity to
correct itself by evaluating the evidence, applying the law and making an
appropriate ruling. A remand of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings is, therefore, in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
in part. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 20, 2003 sustaining the trial court’s denial of
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, as well as its Resolution dated December 16, 2003 denying reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the
SO ORDERED.[6]
Respondent Judge received a copy of the said decision on
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied with
finality on
In the meantime, since no TRO/injunction was issued by the appellate
courts, the proceedings before the trial court continued. Petitioner was declared in default and
plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence ex parte. On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds for
plaintiffs and hereby enters judgment ordering defendant Douglas Lu Ym to
account the following real properties owned by the late Cayetano Ludo and held
by him in trust and for the benefit of herein plaintiffs, on the following
properties, as follows: Tax Declaration No. 01616 under defendant’s name
covering Lot No. 1 (Exh. “H”); Tax Declaration No. 02207 under defendant’s name
covering Lot No. 3 (Exh. “I”); Tax Dec. No.
02143 under the name of Lu Ym Annabel (wife of defendant Douglas Lu Ym) (Exh.
“J”; Tax Dec. No. 00024 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s wife) (Exh.
“K”); Tax Dec. No. 02827 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s wife)
(Exh. “L”); Tax Dec. No. 02826 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s
wife) (M); Tax Dec. No. 03157 under the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s
wife) (Exh. “N”); Transfer Certificate of Title No. 102557 under the name of
defendant Douglas Lu Ym (Exh. “0-1”); Tax Dec. No. 02143 under the name of
Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s wife) (Exh. “P”); Tax Dec. No. 0028 under the name
of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s wife) (Exh. “S”); Tax Dec. No. 01615 under the
name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s wife) (Exh. “U”); Tax Dec. No. 01617 under
the name of Annabelle Lu Ym (defendant’s wife) (Exh. “W”); Tax Dec. No. 02208
under the name of defendant Douglas covering Lot No. 3 (Exh. “Y”); the 1/3
share of the late Cayetano Ludo with the Lu do & Lu Ym Development Corporation,
among which are the following: Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 17029 (Exh.
“AA”), 17032 (Exh. “BB”), 22325 (Exh. “CC”); 22323 (Exh. “DD”); 44057 (Exh.
“EE”); 20514 (Exh. “FF”); 20515 (Exh. “GG”; and 20516 (Exh. “HH”), registered
under the Ludo and Lu Ym Development Corporation of which defendant
The Bureau of Internal Revenue is specifically directed to
compute and impose the estate taxes due on the above mentioned properties of
the late Don Cayetano Ludo.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Invoking the decision in G.R. No. 161309, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the
This
Court received copy of above-cited Decision on
x x x x
Meanwhile, as there was no restraining
order from the Supreme Court, plaintiffs continued to present evidence. Exhibit was formally offered on
In the light also of a recent
Supreme Court Circular, wherein defendant in a civil case is directed to
observe restraint in filing a Motion to Dismiss and instead alleged the grounds
thereof as defenses in the answer, this Court was confident that its ruling on
the Motion to Dismiss which was upheld by the Court of Appeals is in accord
with the said rule. It has already
reached a point of no return. Had the
Honorable Supreme Court dismissed the main case, which is one of the reliefs in
a Petition for Certiorari, it would have been different.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside
Judgment is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals where the case is now
pending.
In the present recourse, petitioner contends that the decision in G.R.
No. 161309, which ordered the trial court to rule on the motion to dismiss,
nullified the respondent Judge’s March 16, 2005 decision on the merits. He theorizes that when the Court ruled that
the respondent Judge must rule on the affirmative defenses in the motion to
dismiss, it logically resulted in the nullification of the trial and all other
proceedings that transpired after the trial court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss. Petitioner thus argues that
respondent Judge defied this Court’s decision when he rendered judgment on
March 16, 2005 and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 20,
2005, notwithstanding actual receipt on March 28, 2005 of the decision in G.R.
No. 161309. Petitioner thus prays that
the Court of Appeals before whom the March 16, 2005 decision was appealed be ordered
to remand the records of the case to the trial court for the latter to rule on
the motion to dismiss; and that the case be re-assigned to the pairing judge of
herein respondent Judge.
On the part of respondent Atty. Mahinay, his defiance of the February 23,
2005 Decision of the Court allegedly consists in the filing of the following pleadings,
to wit:
(1) Motion to
direct the government (thru the Office of the President) to enter its
appearance. Filed on April 5, 2005, this
motion was based on the dispositive portion of the March 16, 2005 Decision of
the trial court ordering the Bureau of Internal Revenue to compute the
inheritance tax on the properties of the late Cayetano;
(2) Comment on
petitioners’ motion seeking the inhibition of respondent Judge where respondent
Atty. Mahinay stated that the February 23, 2005 Decision of the Court in G.R.
No. 161309, is now moot and academic;
(3) April 27,
2005 letter-pleading addressed to a certain Mr. John L. Lu Ym, President and
Chairman of Ludo Development Corporation informing him that his clients are
withdrawing any authority of petitioner to act as trustee of Gertrudes and the
other plaintiffs.[11]
(4) Motion for
issuance of an entry of Judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-27717;[12]
and
(5) Manifestation
in G.R. No. 161309 stating that the trial court’s March 16, 2005 verdict rendered
the Decision in G.R. No. 161309, moot and academic.[13]
In his Comment, respondent Judge contends
that he never had the slightest intention to disobey, much more to insult the Court. He further states that he has always been a
good soldier of the Court and was in fact cited by the Rotary Club as the
Regional Trial Court Judge with the highest number of disposed cases in Region
VII for the year 2005.
Atty. Mahinay likewise claims that he never intended to offend or defy
the Court and that there is nothing contumacious in the pleadings he filed and
in the theories he advanced as they were merely intended to advance the legitimate
cause of his clients.
The sole issue here is whether
respondents are guilty of indirect contempt.
We rule in the negative.
Pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, read:
Sec. 3. Indirect
contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given
to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior
of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court x x x.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court
by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not
only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration
of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice.[14] Contempt of court is a defiance of the
authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.[15]
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.[16] However, such power should be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should
the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Only in cases of clear
and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. Such power
being drastic and extra-ordinary in its nature should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.[17]
In the present case, the assailed acts
of respondents do not constitute disobedience to, or defiance of the decision
in G.R. No. 161309. The Court never
stated therein that the March 16, 2005 decision of respondent Judge, or any
judgment on the merits rendered pending decision of the Court, should be set
aside. Note that no TRO or injunction
was issued to restrain the proceedings below.
Unrestrained, the trial, presentation of evidence and rendition of
judgment would logically take their course, and respondent Judge could not be
faulted for proceeding with the rendition of judgment.
Moreover, the main thrust of the
Court’s decision in G.R. No. 161309, was to order the trial court to rule on
the issues raised by petitioner in the motion to dismiss. This had already been substantially satisfied
by the respondent Judge in his March 16, 2005 decision. In holding that the probated will of
Cayetano did not in fact settle his estate as the same was simulated and intended
merely to evade payment of taxes, respondent Judge in effect debunked the claim
of valid assignment of rights over the properties in favor of petitioner and
the Lu Ym Corporation as well as petitioner’s assertion that the probate of
Cayetano’s will constituted res judicata and a bar to the relitigation
of the same properties. So also, the
pronouncement of respondent Judge that Gertrudes is the common law wife of
Cayetano is recognition of Gertrudes’ capacity to sue. In the same vein, the full faith and credence
accorded by respondent Judge on the allegations and testimonies of Gertrudes
and her witnesses addressed the issue of fraud invoked by petitioner.
It is therefore clear that to nullify
the March 16, 2005 decision of respondent Judge and to conduct anew the
proceedings before the trial court for the sole purpose of ruling on the motion
to dismiss, would be a waste of time which would further delay the resolution
of this case. Furthermore, the assailed
March 16, 2005 decision of the trial court is now on appeal before the Court of
Appeals. It is therefore before the latter
court where the issue of the nullification of the trial court’s decision should
be addressed.
In sum, we find that respondents did not commit any act amounting to
indirect contempt. To reiterate, respondent
Judge’s March 16, 2005 Decision and May 20, 2005 Order do not constitute
defiance of the Court’s verdict in G.R. No. 161309. It follows therefore that the pleadings
filed by respondent Atty. Mahinay in reliance of the aforesaid decision and
order of the trial court are not as well contumacious. Indeed, an act to be considered contemptuous
must be clearly contrary or prohibited by the order of the Court. A person cannot, for disobedience, be
punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done
is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[18]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
452 SCRA 298. Penned by Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga and concurred in by Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno,
Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Minita V. Chico-Nazario.
[2]
Alias “Crispin N. Lu.”
[3] In
his petition for naturalization, Cayetano allegedly declared that his wife is
Uy Ching Gee (Rollo, p. 40).
[4] Rollo, pp. 39-42.
[5]
[6] Supra note 1 at 311.
[7] Rollo, p. 136.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Heirs
of De Leon Vda. De Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138660, February 5,
2004, 422 SCRA 101, 115.
[15]
[16]
[17] Abad
v. Somera, G.R. No. 82216,
[18]